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The essay by Professors Cameron and Hoffenberg on practice guideline development activities, and in March
“Ethics and the International Society of Nephrology: 1996, they issued a “Joint Statement of Principles Relat-
Paid organ donation and the use of executed prisoners ing to Practice Guideline Development” [2].
as donors” in this issue of Kidney International [1] raises More recently, the American Society of Nephrology
procedural as well as substantive issues for consideration and Renal Physicians Association have appointed a task
by the International Society of Nephrology (ISN). I first force to develop evidence-based clinical practice guide-
review the procedural issues of whether the ISN should lines on the selection of patients (that is, the indications)
(1) propose or endorse guidelines on ethical issues in for dialysis of acute and of chronic renal failure and also
nephrology and (2) establish ethical requirements for to address the forgoing or discontinuation of dialysis.
members who receive financial support. Thereafter, I These guidelines are expected to be available in the
discuss the substantive issues of (1) paid organ donation fall of 1999 and will meet the needs of United States
and (2) the transplantation of organs of executed pris- nephrologists. They are unlikely, however, to be univer-
oners. sally applicable. Thus, if global or even European guide-
lines are desired, the ISN may wish to commission or
facilitate such an undertaking.PROCEDURAL ISSUE I
Guidelines
One procedural issue is whether the ISN should pro- PROCEDURAL ISSUE II
pose or endorse guidelines on ethical issues in nephrol- Ethical requirements
ogy. Guidelines could address procedural and/or sub-
Another procedural issue noted in the commentarystantive issues that confront nephrologists in the care of
by Cameron and Hoffenberg is whether the ISN shouldpatients or in clinical or basic research. Such issues in-
have ethical requirements of its members who receiveclude the acceptance of patients for dialysis and/or trans-
financial support (for example, fellowships or travelplantation, the management of difficult or challenging
grants) from the ISN. This recommendation was madepatients (noncompliant, disruptive, or abusive patients),
(when the formation of the ISN Ethics Committee wasthe withdrawal from dialysis of competent or incompe-
announced in February 1996) in an Invited Contributiontent patients, and scientific integrity (the responsible con-
to Kidney International from the then ISN President,duct of research). With regard to clinical practice and
guideline development in nephrology in the United Robert W. Schrier [3]. Professors Cameron and Hoffenb-
States, it should be noted that the American Society of erg question “whether a system of universal ethics which
Nephrology, the National Kidney Foundation, and the can be applied world-wide can be developed” and assert
Renal Physicians Association have merged their clinical that “the ISN would be open to charges of ‘ethical impe-
rialism’ if it were to attempt to impose ethical criteria
based on Greek-Judaic-Islamic systems on other majorKey words: organ donation, guidelines for transplantation, ethical is-
sues in nephrology. countries of ancient civilizations that have developed
their own ethical codes, for example, China, Japan, and
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They conclude, “Let the debate continue in the forums is, to consensus on the legal limits of behavior. Indeed,
it may be easier to agree on what is unacceptable, unjust,of the ISN itself and elsewhere.”
To begin the debate, let me turn to the authors’ ques- or wrong than to agree on what is appropriate, just, or
right. For example, most agree that war, murder, torture,tion of whether a system of universal ethics can be devel-
oped. I believe it can be and that the basis for such a violation of the physical or psychological integrity of
others (for example, female circumcision), wanton de-system is human dignity, which, in turn, is the basis of
fundamental human rights. struction or pollution of the environment, and wasteful
consumption of natural resources are wrong.
My proposals for a prescriptive or a proscriptive uni-
UNIVERSAL ETHICAL STANDARDS:
versalist ethic involve a different approach to the ques-
A MODEST PROPOSAL
tion of universalizability of ethical principles and values
My proposal of a universalist ethic (that is, of universal than the deontologic-utilitarian dichotomy (distinction)
ethical standards) is the following: (a) a respect for all of Professors Cameron and Hoffenberg wherein they
life, for the dignity of human life, and for individuals; see the deontologic ethic as absolutist and universaliza-
(b) a guarantee of freedom for individuals to pursue ble (that is, independent of time or social circumstances)
their own conception of the good (so long as it respects and both the utilitarian ethic and casuistry as contextual
community and the rights of others) and to achieve their (and neither absolutist nor universalizable). In contrast,
innate potential; (c) a recognition, respect, and tolerance I distinguish universalizability from absolutism. Further-
of diversity and social subsidiarity (the right of local more, only general secular ethical precepts (which point
communities to address their own social issues); (d) a one in the proper direction) are universalizable, and,
respect for the right of individuals or their families (or as Englehardt defends at great length and with great
surrogates) to make voluntary, informed autonomous scholarship, to know in detail what one should do re-
decisions (or related autonomous decisions with one’s quires the “concrete, canonical, content-full” morality
family); (e) a respect for communities whether they be of a nonglobal (that is, local) moral (and often religious)
local or global, ethnic, cultural, religious, professional, community [4].
political, or other; ( f) a respect for natural, civil, political,
and human rights and for the just distribution of funda-
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUESmental human goods; and (g) a respect for and protection
of the environment, the diversity of life, and natural Let me begin the discussion of substantive issues by
stating that I believe the essay of Professors Cameronresources.
For each of these seven standards, the principles of and Hoffenberg is an important contribution in no small
measure because its views are unconventional and chal-nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, and prudence are
complementary. I believe the standards and the princi- lenge conventional wisdom, or at least challenge tradi-
tional Western or Northern custom or practice. Noteples to be universally (globally) acceptable and applicable,
though their local and cultural implementation require that the word “moral” is derived from the Latin “mos”
(plural “mores”) meaning custom(s). The authors’ chal-interpretation, qualification, and some degree of flexibil-
ity. For example, although I believe respect for individu- lenge to the United States or Western views (that both
the payment of organ donors and the transplantation ofals, communities, and the environment is universally
mandatory for all people at all times, the definition of organs of executed prisoners are immoral) could result
in either a modification of our views (which I believewhat is good, right, or just is subject to quantitative
cultural interpretation, flexibility, and some latitude for the authors would find appropriate from the utilitarian
perspective) or a strengthening of our views—hopefullychange over time.
To summarize briefly, this universal but not absolutist after careful analysis of them and of their justification.
I will not provide an exhaustive ethical analysis of theethic (respect for life, for individuals, for community, for
the environment—tempered by respect for diversity and two substantive issues, but rather will attempt to discern
the authors’ apparent positions on the issues that theyliberty) is hopefully an aspirational or maximalist ethic
to be applied in a prudent or minimalist fashion at a global themselves recognize are controversial if not provoca-
tive. Their “review [of] the arguments from both sides”level. Locally or culturally, it may be supplemented by
Englehardt’s “canonical, content-full” ethic based on the of both issues and their effort “to debate” the issues
themselves by providing the main arguments and counter-religions or moral traditions of a community [4].
If my proposal is seen as unrealistic, overly optimistic, arguments are nearly balanced, but I believe I can per-
ceive (implicit in their arguments) support for paid oror “Pollyannaish,” then consider a legalistic, minimalis-
tic, ethical approach. Although not all agree to a univer- rewarded organ donation and condonation (if not accep-
tance) of the transplantation of organs of executed pris-salizable ethic, especially if it is absolutist, most agree
to the need for boundaries of permissible behavior, that oners.
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SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE I mitting paid donation is not to say that either would be
preferable to a policy of presumed consent for organPaid organ donation
donation, which I would favor so long as there were a
With regard to the payment of donors for organ dona- provision for opting out (even though the policy is nearly
tion, the authors purport that because “the need for as controversial in countries that have statutorily ap-
organs is indisputable” and because “kidney transplanta- proved it as in those that have not), and so long as there
tion is the most satisfactory and successful mode of treat- were no scientific breakthroughs that would make xeno-
ing end-stage renal failure in the great majority of pa- transplantation successful and safe.
tients . . . any practice that augments the number of Although financial incentives to organ donation dis-
kidneys available for transplantation must be . . . re- criminate against the poor but are only arguably an af-
garded as beneficent unless it carries with it over-riding front to human dignity (intraculturally as well as proba-
bad consequences which outweigh its benefits.” First, let bly transculturally), financial incentives to allocation of
me suggest this utilitarian perspective is amenable to donor organs is less questionably and—I suspect—
empiric research. Indeed, the National Kidney Founda- universally reprehensible. Thus, even if the deontologic
tion in its June 1993 publication, “Controversies in Organ argument of universality (a Kantian categorical impera-
Donation: A Summary Report,” reported several pleas tive, if you will) is questionably applicable to financial
for empiric studies (rather than public opinion surveys) incentives to donation, it certainly does apply to alloca-
to ascertain whether financial incentives would increase tion of organs to the highest bidder (save, of course, in
organ donation [5]. the opinion of high bidders, that is, wealthy persons in
Next, let me state that I find the authors’ counter- need of a transplant—who are egocentric, albeit under-
arguments to the “five main arguments against payment standably so).
for organs” more persuasive than their presentation of
the arguments against payment. Thus, I conclude that
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE IIthey are not opposed to paid donation even though they
admit “coercion and exploitation may occur when there Transplantation of organs of executed prisoners
is a need for a donation within a family” and that in the As is also true of the first substantive issue, paid organ
real world, there has been exploitation of the poor and donation, I believe the authors’ utilitarian argument
substandard transplantation (less well-matched trans- (placing the onus “on those who oppose a measure to
plantation and “inadequate screening for transmittable increase the supply of organs . . . to produce convincing
disease”). Like the authors, I too would not object to a arguments” against the measure) once again places the
carefully designed trial of rewarded-gift donation, but I authors in a position favoring the transplantation of or-
would begin with less controversial types of payment gans of executed prisoners unless they are convinced by
such as payment of burial or funeral costs or payment arguments to the contrary (which I hope they will be).
of a portion of the expenses of the terminal hospitaliza- The strength of their counterarguments (against “argu-
tion of cadeveric donors. ments against the practice of using the organs of executed
To allow an empiric trial is not necessarily to condone prisoners”) is, in my opinion, weaker than that of their
the practice, but rather to ascertain public values in prac- counterarguments (against payment for donation of or-
tice as opposed to a survey asking hypothetical questions gans); however, I think the strength of the deontologic
or presenting hypothetical vignettes. Indeed, the moral- argument in this case (that truly voluntary, uncoerced
ity of paid donation or rewarded-gift donation is ascer- refusal of organ donation by a prisoner on death row is
tainable empirically, whereas the ethics or systematic not possible) is stronger.
evaluation of what is right, good, or just is a cognitive I speculate that the authors believe the counterargu-
exercise, such as that presented by Professors Cameron ments (that is, the arguments against the “arguments
and Hoffenberg. And it is the empiric question of whether against the practice of using the organs of executed pris-
people find paid donation an affront not only to altruism oners”) in all five instances (if abuse of the practices
(in which case paid donation could decrease organ dona- could be eliminated) win. Thus, I believe they feel it is
tion rather than simply not increase it), but also to basic acceptable (I repeat, if abuses were eliminated) to use
human dignity that is central to a deontologic as opposed the organs of executed prisoners. I respectfully disagree
to an utilitarian approach to this issue. One would need and find all five arguments (especially argument numbers
an empirical study of different populations with different 2, 3, and 4 assuming the sale of prisoners’ kidneys and
cultural, religious, philosophical, and social traditions to their unjust allocation are stopped, mooting argument
understand whether the attitudes were universally held number 5) weigh against the use of prisoners’ organs.
or—as the authors would say—“contextual.” Most importantly, I believe the potential for a coerced
Finally, with regard to this first substantive issue, I decision to donate organs (to someone they do not even
know) of prisoners (especially those on death row) isshould note that to accept a trial or a public policy per-
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too great to condone. Indeed, I find this a violation of justify any measure to do so (that is, remember that the
end does not in itself justify the means). Furthermore,a fundamental human right: to wit, to decide what is to
be done to/with one’s body, much as I suspect the authors even if the means were not ethically objectionable, the
seemingly praiseworthy end of increasing organ dona-believe capital punishment is wrong (because they state
“there are a number of cogent arguments against reten- tion and decreasing organ shortage might conceivably
be counterproductive if it decreased the pressure on soci-tion of this penalty, some of a moral nature, others more
practical”), even though they state that “it is not our ety to improve consensual, altruistic donation, or the
pressure on society to financially support scientific re-intention to debate this important and emotionally
charged issue.” search that would improve the success of human trans-
plantation or of xenotransplantation.On the other hand, we could argue that it would be
ethically permissible (certainly less questionable) to I join Professors Cameron and Hoffenberg in the hope
that this dialectic and future debate will promote interestallow a prisoner on death row to donate an organ upon
death by execution to a relative or a friend. In fact, one in, reflection about, and informed analysis of these chal-
lenging ethical issues that affect nephrologists and theircould even imagine this to be less coercive than to allow
a nonprisoner to make a living donation to a family patients.
Professors Cameron and Hoffenberg assist the readermember (because the prisoner could refuse without fear
of the life-long deprecation or frank disapproval by the in proper ethical analysis of the issues most relevant to
nephrologists by specifically isolating the ethical ques-potential recipient or other family members that the
nonprisoner might experience, as the prisoner’s life will tions (of paid donation and of transplantation of organs
of executed prisoners) from “the larger political andnot be long and that of the nonprisoner will be.)
Finally, with regard to this second substantive issue, economic issues such as the huge variations in material
wealth” and of access to healthcare, and from “the penalI wish to state that I would allow the transplantation of
deceased prisoners’ organs if, and only if, the society code which in some countries—but not others—still con-
dones and practices judicial execution.” They clearly sep-had a universal presumed-consent policy for all members
arate the use of executed prisoners as donors from theof the society. The authors might find this statement
larger question of the morality of capital punishment.inconsistent with my deontologic opposition to trans-
They further assist the reader by separating the basicplantation of prisoners’ organs otherwise—based on the
ethical issues “as they should or could be practiced” fromfundamental right to self-determination with respect to
“their possible or actual abuse in the real world,” therebyone’s body and its organs. However, it is not inconsistent
helping us to avoid the trap they say is common in theso long as the presumed consent policy has a provision
literature in which “often practice has been confusedfor opting out, and I would insist that there be such a
with principle.”provision that would allow anyone in the society (includ-
After there has been an opportunity for an expressioning prisoners) to refuse donation (or postmortem pro-
of opinion by ISN members and Kidney Internationalcurement) on religious, philosophical, or even personal-
readers, I recommend that the Council of the ISN takeidiosyncratic grounds. Unless an individual exercised
a stand on the procedural issues (if not also on the sub-that provision (that is, opted out), the presumed-consent
stantive issues) even if there is no international consen-policy would, of course, make the individual’s organs
sus. A statement of a moral position on the issues couldavailable for transplantation upon death of the indi-
serve as an aspirational standard and need not be en-vidual.
forced by coercive disciplinary action. Furthermore, al-
though it might be easier to obtain international consen-
CONCLUDING COMMENTS sus on procedural than on substantive issues, I believe
I wish again to compliment the authors on their well- we could achieve consensus on substantive matters of
reasoned, self-argued debate of both substantive issues human dignity and human rights. For example, Profes-
and on their raising procedural issues for consideration sors Cameron and Hoffenberg, of course, agree that it is
by the leadership of the ISN and by its members and wrong to execute prisoners for the purpose of obtaining
readers. Although they espouse “logical and thoughtful organs even though the transplantation of organs (all
debate,” dispassionate analysis, and “thoughtful discus- other things being equal) is a good thing (that is, a desir-
sion . . . in a global context,” they might also agree that able end). Similarly, one could argue whether the con-
empiric study would be helpful. A well-planned study sent to donate organs by a prisoner on death row could
of financial incentives to transplantation would be ethical ever be voluntary or free of coercion but yet agree that
even if it failed to increase organ donation, since we voluntary, noncoerced, informed consent is necessary
would then know that we should not introduce such a for organ donation/procurement. Similarly, one could
public policy. On the other hand, one must remember argue whether a prisoner convicted of a capital offense
should lose his/her right to voluntary, informed refusalthat an increase in organ donation does not ethically
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